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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARK PUGHf 
Applicant/Respondent , 
vs. 
BRUCE RING (Uninsured), 
Defendant/Respondent , 
DENNIS JACOBSEN and/or STATE 
INSURANCE FUNDf 
Defendants/Appellants, 
DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
STATEMENT J ^ ^ 
1. Did the Industrial Commission ert by incorrectly conclud-
ing that a statutory employer/employee relationship existed 
between Dennis Jacobsen and Bruce Ring? 
2. Did the Industrial Commission erip by incorrectly conclud-
ing that when a statutory employer/employee relationship exists, 
the liability as between the common law employer and the statutory 
employer is joint and severalf rather than primary and secondary 
respectively? 
3. Did the Industrial Commission err by failing to involve 
the Default Indemnity Fund (Uninsured Employers Fund) in the 
scheme of liability as a surety for the uninsured employer - Bruce 
Ring? 
Industrial Commission 
Case No. 85000966 
Supreme Court No. 860357 
STATEMENT_QF_THE_CASE 
Nature of the Case 
A Petition for Writ of Review was filed by the defendants 
Dennis Jacobsen/State Insurance Fund for review of an Order 
of the Industrial Commission holding them liable for workmen's 
compensation benefits to Mark Pugh. 
A hearing was held on March 19f 1986 before the Industrial 
Commission Administrative Law Judge Richard G. Sumsion on Mark 
Pughfs application for workmen's compensation benefits. Liability 
was denied by Dennis Jacobsen/State Insurance Fund on the ground 
that Dennis Jacobsen was not a statutory employer of Bruce 
Ring (or any of Mr. Ring's employees) under the provisions of Utah 
Code Annotatedf Section 35-1-42 (1953, as amended). On March 26, 
1986 an order was entered by Judge Sumsion holding that Dennis 
Jacobsen was a statutory employer, and was jointly and severally 
liable along with Bruce Ring for the payment of workmen's compen-
sation benefits to Mark Pugh. 
A Motion for Review was filed by Dennis Jacobsen/State 
Insurance Fund on April 18, 1986. On June 13, 1986 the Industrial 
Commission denied defendant's Motion for Review and the Admini-
strative Law Judge's Order was affirmed. 
STATEMEIJT^QF^FACTS 
Dennis Jacobsen was a general contractor engaged in the 
business of constructing buildings, most of which were resi-
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dential. (R-89, 90.) It was Jacobsenfs udual practice to subcon-
tract about 80% of his work to subcontractors. (R-90.) Bruce 
Ring was a carpenter by trade. (R-66.) Ring subcontracted to do 
the carpentry work in the construction of a garage and addition to 
a house in which Dennis Jacobsen was the general contractor (R-68, 
69). Applicant, Mark Pugh was employed as a laborer/carpenters 
helper by Bruce Ring, working at a rate of $5.50 per hour. 
(R-46.) Pugh's wages were paid directly by Ring. (R-56.) While 
engaged in this subcontracting job, Ring was free to work on jobs 
for other general contractors. (R-76.) Jacobsen did not direct 
Ring as to a time to commence work or stop work. (R-91.) Ring 
provided his own tools and all the tools for Pugh. (R-75.) 
Jacobsen did no actual carpentry work himself. (R-76.) Jacobsen 
did not show Ring or Pugh how to accomplish any specific carpentry 
task. (R-98.) Jacobsen had no right to hire or fire Ringfs 
employees. (R-77.) On October 2, 1985 Bruce Ring and Mark Pugh 
were putting up a beam while engaged in the subcontracting work on 
the above mentioned garage job. (R-49.) The ladder upon which 
Mr. Pugh was standing slipped out from under himf causing him to 
fall to the ground. Bruce Ring then fell on top of Pugh. As a 
result of this accident, Mr. Pugh sustained injuries to his neck 
which required surgery. (R 49-51.) Bruce Ring was an uninsured 
employer (R-150), while Dennis Jacobsen was insured by State 
Insurance Fund. 
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SUMMA£Y_OF_ARGOMENTS 
The Industrial Commission erred by incorrectly concluding 
that a statutory employer/employee relationship existed between 
the general contractorf Dennis Jacobsenf and subcontractor/ Bruce 
Ring. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated/ Section 35-1-42 (1953 as 
amended)f there are two criteria/ bQ&h of which must be met/ in 
order for a statutory employer/employee relationship to exist. 
First/ one must have the right to control execution of the work 
for which he has contracted. Secondly/ the work which he has 
contracted to be performed must be a part or process in the trade 
or business of such employer. Because Dennis Jacobsen did not 
retain the requisite supervision and control over Bruce Ringf nor 
was Ringfs work a part or process in Jacobsen1s business/ there is 
no such statutory relationship between Jacobsen and Ring (or any 
of Ring's employees). 
Even if a statutory employer/employee relationship does exist 
as between Dennis Jacobsen and Bruce Ring, the liability imposed 
is not joint and several/ but rather primary and secondaryf with 
primary liability being thrust upon the more immediate common law 
employer/ Bruce Ring. 
Further/ the Industrial Commission erred by failing to 
involve the Default Indemnity Fund (Uninsured Employer Fund) in 
the scheme of liability. The Uninsured Employers Fund is to act 
as a surety for those uninsured employers who are primarily 
liable. Accordingly/ the Uninsured Employers Fund steps into the 
shoes of Bruce Ring and becomes liable prior to Dennis Jacobsen/ 
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State Insurance Fund. Dennis Jacobsen/State Insurance Fund 
should be placed in a position of secondary liability only if 
nonpayment by Ring and the Uninsured Employers Fund occurs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY 
INCORRECTLY CONCLUDING THAT A STATUTORY EMPLOYER/EM-
PLOYEE RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN DENNIS JACOBSEN AND 
BRUCE RING. 
This Court has held that the question of whether one engaged 
in service to another is an employee or an independent contractor 
is a jurisdictional issue which requires the Court to weigh the 
evidence to determine whether or not it preponderates in favor of 
the Industrial Commissions order. Rll§£|l£I Lsdafi^Y^^Iudasilial 
Commission, 562 P.2d 227 (Utahf 1977); LuJssx^ SflJifl-aDd-filflYfil 
QQBmQX-~X±-In&li§£lial--CmBi££iQnr 82 UTAH 188f 23 P.2d 225 
(1933). Where the evidence is largely uncontradicted, as in the 
case at bar, it is not so much a matter of weighing the evidence 
in the record as of determining whether the Commission arrived at 
the correct conclusion of law. EustlSX^-LsdaS—^JL-Illdusilisi 
Commissions, supra. 
In determining whether or not one is an employee of another 
for workmen's compensation purposes, it is necessary to consult 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-42 (1953, as amended). This 
section sets forth the distinction between an employee and an 
independent contractor. The definitions of these terms are 
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mutually exclusive. Section 35-1-42 provides in pertinent partf 
as follows: 
Where any employer procures any work to be done wholly 
or in part for him by a contractor over whose work he 
retains supervision or controlf and this work is a part 
or process in the trade or business of the employer, the 
contractorf all persons employed by him, all subcon-
tractors under him, and all persons employed by any of 
these subcontractorsf are considered employees of the 
original employer. 
Any person, firm, or corporation engaged in the per-
formance of work as an independent contractor is 
considered an employer. 
"Independent contractor" means any person, association, 
or corporation engaged in the performance of any work 
for another who, while so engaged, is independent of the 
employer in all that pertains to the execution of the 
work, is not subject to the rule or control of the 
employer, is engaged only in the performance of a 
definite job or piece of work, and is subordinate to the 
employer only in effecting a result in accordance with 
the employerfs design. 
Thus, the foregoing provision sets forth a two-prong test 
which must be satisfied for one to be deemed a statutory em-
ployer. First, one must have the right to control execution of 
the work for which he has contracted. Second, the work which he 
has contracted to be performed must be a "part or process in the 
trade or business" of such employer. Inasmuch as this test is 
set forth in the conjunctive, it is necessary that each require-
ment be met before one can be considered a statutory employer 
liable for the payment of workmanfs compensation benefits. 
A. DENNIS JACOBSEN, AS GENERAL CONTRACTOR, DID NOT 
RETAIN THE REQUISITE ACTUAL SUPERVISION OR RIGHT OF 
CONTROL OVER THE WORK OF BRUCE RING SO AS TO INVOKE A 
STATUTORY EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP. 
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The case of Graham Y--._R-i.-Thp I ne_ Found at ion , 675 P.2d 1196 
(Utah 1984) strongly supports appellants' contention that Dennis 
Jacobsen did not retain the requisite supervision or control over 
the work of Bruce Ring so as to make Dennis Jacobsen a statutory 
employer of Bruce Ring and/or anyone employed by Mr. Ring, 
The facts of GxaljaiD are as follows: Graham was a carpenter 
with 41 years of experience predominately in roofing. Graham was 
retained by a general contractorf Thornef whereby Graham was to 
shingle some of the roofs on homes Thorne was building and bill on 
a monthly basis for any work done. Thorne made no deductions for 
social security or withholding taxes as required generally by 
employers. Graham used his own tools and established his own work 
schedule. He worked on any house he chose whether being con-
structed by Thorne or someone else who had employed Graham on 
unrelated jobs. Graham had the right t}o hire others who would 
work under his control and supervision. Further, Thorne had 
almost all phases of his construction work done by independent 
contractors. At one timef Thorne told Graham to leave the 
construction at two of Thornefs homes in order to commence a 
third and to dry the roof before shingling. Graham contended that 
he was entitled to workmen's compensation benefits from Thorne 
because Thorne was his "statutory employer" at the time Graham 
fell from a roof he was shingling. The Industrial Commission 
denied Graham any benefits and Graham appealed. 
In affirming the decision of the Industrial Commission, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The applicant leans heavily on but one of two factors 
required in §35-1-42(2). We are of the opinion that the 
second factor, "supervision or control" by Thorne is not 
supported sufficiently to establish compensability in 
favor of Graham as an eligible "employee." . . . In 
determining whether the statutory requirements are met 
the courts have considered numerous factors relating to 
the employer-employee relationship, and have pointed out 
that none of them considered alone is completely 
controlling, but that they all should be considered 
together in determining whether the requirements of the 
statute are met. 
Speaking in generality: An employee is one who is 
hired and paid a salary, a wage, or at a fixed rate, to 
perform the employers work as directed by the employer 
and is subject to a comparatively high degree of control 
in performing those duties. In contrast, an independent 
contractor is one who is engaged to do some particular 
project or piece of work, usually for a set total sum, 
who may do the job in his own way, subject to only 
minimal restrictions or controls and is responsible only 
for its satisfactory completion. 
675 P.2d at 1198. 
Many parallels can be drawn between SlSbaiu and the case at 
bar. Just as Graham was retained by a general contractor who had 
almost all phases of his construction work done by independent 
contractors, Bruce Ring was retained by Dennis Jacobsen, a 
general contractor who usually subcontracted about 80% of his work 
to sub-contractors. (R-90.) The general contractor in Giahajn made 
no deductions for social security or withholding taxes as gen-
erally required by employees. Likewise, Mr. Jacobsen did not make 
any deductions or withholdings from Mr. Rings paychecks. (R-92.) 
Another similarity between SX3&3IB and the case at bar is that both 
Graham and Bruce Ring provided their own tools for working on 
their respective jobs. (R-75.) Further, each man established his 
own work schedule. If another general contractor (other than 
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Mr. Jacobsen) had a construction job in which he needed helpf 
Mr. Ring was free to go and work for that general contractor on 
another job. (R-76 and R-91.) Also, just as in QLShSBr 
Mr. Jacobsen had no right to hire or fijre Mr. Ring's employees. 
(R-77.) 
While none of the above mentioned factors considered alone is 
I 
completely controlling, when they are considered together and the 
entire relationship is scrutinized, it ^s readily apparent that 
Dennis Jacobsen did not retain the supervision or control over 
Bruce Ring which is necessary to label one a "statutory 
employer." Each of the specific factors mentioned by the Gj;.§i)am 
Court is analogous to the case at bar. The extent of control or 
supervision retained by Mr. Jacobsen ovei Mr. Ring was certainly 
no greater than that retained by Thorne over Grahamf as Mr. Ring 
enjoyed great latitude in the performance of his work. 
Furthermore, when the relationship between Jacobsen and Ring 
is looked at in terms of the "generalities" which the Qi^MlB Court 
spoke of, the same conclusion must be reached. Bruce Ring was not 
paid a fixed hourly or monthly rate to perform Dennis Jacobsenfs 
work; nor was Ring subject to a comparatively high degree of 
control in performing his duties. Ratherf Mr. Ring was one who 
was engaged to do a particular piece of work for a fixed sum. 
(R-83.) Ring was permitted to do the job in his own wayf subject 
only to performance in a workmanlike manner. This is evidenced by 
Mr. Ring's testimony in which he stated that Mr. Jacobsen never 
gave him instructions on how to put up a wall, or put on a roof, 
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or anything of that type. (R-85.) The most specific instruction 
which Mr, Ring received from Mr. Jacobsen was to "build the 
garage first." (R-85.) In performing his dutiesf Mr. Ring 
followed plans and specifications which were provided by the 
owners and architects. Any changes or variances which needed to 
be madef came at the behest of the owners and architects rather 
then Mr. Jacobsen. (R-86 and R-92.) In accordance with the 
Ql3h&m Court's statement in which it spoke "in generality" supraf 
these additional factors indicate that Bruce Ring was not an 
employee of Dennis Jacobsen, but rather that Ring was an inde-
pendent contractor. 
Another Utah case which supports appellants1 contention is 
H3iry_L^Youfl.g_£^ 538 P.2d 316 (Utah 1975). 
There the Court stated that the main facts to be considered in 
determining whether or not a statutory employer/employee relation-
ship exist are: (1) whatever covenants or agreements exist 
concerning the right of direction and control over the employeef 
whether express or implied; (2) the right to hire and fire; (3) 
the method of payment, ief whether in wages or fees, as compared 
to payment for a complete job or project; and (4) the furnishing 
of the equipment. Other factors sometimes considered are the 
skill required in a particular occupation, the length of time for 
which the person is retained, and the nature of the relationship 
the parties believed they were creating. C]}xi5££3B_^_l£dlJ5£li3l 
Commission, 113 Utah 451, 196 P.2d 502 (1948). 
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In considering the additional factors which the AsiliSD and 
Christen Courts deemed to be important as bearing on the issue of 
control and supervision it is evident that the relationship in 
the case at bar compels a finding that there was not enough 
supervision or control so as to make Jacobsen an employer of 
Ring, In looking at the covenants or agreements between Jacobsen 
and Ring, it is apparent that Jacobsen had little if any control 
over Ring, When there exists no formal written agreements, as in 
the parties conduct to 
existence, as well as to 
the case here, it is necessary to examine 
discern what implied covenants may be in 
determine the nature of the relationship the parties believed they 
were creating. In examining the record it can be clearly seen 
that there was an implied understanding between Jacobsen and Ring 
that Ring was to enjoy much freedom in the execution of his work. 
Jacobsenfs conduct exhibits the relinquishment of his control and 
supervision over Ring. Jacobsen would yisit the work-site about 
three times a week, spending anywhere from 15 minutes to a full 
day at the site. (R-93.) During the six weeks in which Ring was 
performing his duties, Jacobsen stayed at the worksite a full day 
only three times. On these three occasions in which Jacobsen 
spent an entire day at the work site, he worked on other phases of 
the project such as pouring concrete or engaging in backfilling 
work. (R-93.) 
Further, the reason that Jacobsen hirbd Ring to perform this 
piece of the work is because Jacobsen was not as proficient at 
carpentry as Ring, and Jacobsen wanted t|o get someone who was 
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better qualified than himself to perform that task. (R-99.) 
Thus, taking into consideration the limited amount of time which 
Jacobsen spent at the work site, as well as the reason why he 
hired Ring to do the carpentry work, the conclusion to be drawn 
is that Jacobsen intended not to retain any supervision or control 
over Ring. Rather, the conduct of the parties indicates that 
there was an implied agreement that Ring was to enjoy much freedom 
in going about his business. 
Another Utah case which indicates that Jacobsen did not 
retain the requisite control or supervision over Ring is 
5SffiBgivill£_^^ 113 Utah 504, 196 P.2d 718 
(1948). In SfilMBeixillg, the Court stated: 
It is now well settled in this jurisdiction 
that the crucial factor in determining whether 
an applicant for workmenfs compensation is an 
employee or an independent contractor is 
whether or not the person for whom the 
services were performed had the right to 
control the execution of the work. . . . 
In this case there is no evidence that 
Mrs,. Cook had any right to control the work of 
plaintiff and Gardner. The evidence clearly 
shows that she did not attempt to control the 
work in any particular, but on the contrary 
she merely showed them what work she wanted 
done and left it entirely up to them as to the 
method or manner of accomplishing the desired 
end result. . . . The preponderance of the 
evidence points to absence of right of control 
on the part of Mrs. Cook. She was interested 
only in the end result - that the repairs be 
accomplished. She was not interested in the 
manner in which plaintiff and Gardner 
accomplished this end. 196 P.2d at 720. 
The situation in the case at bar is analogous to that of 
Sommeryille. Just as Mrs. Cook did not attempt to control the 
12 
work of the plaintiffs in any particular, but rather, merely 
showed them what work she wanted donef suph is the case as between 
Jacobsen and Ring. As previously mentioned, the most specific 
instruction which was given to Ring at Jacobsenfs behest was, 
"Ifd like you to do the garage first, and then work on the 
addition." (R-85.) The manner or method of accomplishing this 
desired end result was entirely up to Mr. Ring. Just as Mrs. Cook 
was interest only in the end result - that the repairs be 
accomplished, so Mr. Jacobsenfs concern was with the end result -
that the project be completed in a workmanlike and timely 
fashion. (R-76.) That isf the only inpijit Jacobsen had regarding 
Ring's work was as the subcontracting job related to the comple-
tion of the entire project or; in ^ome instances, changes 
requested by the architect or the owner. It is important to note 
that the architect and owner sometimes went directly to Ring to 
affect changes in the plan bypassing Jacobsen altogether. 
(R-92.) This is certainly not the t^pe of "control or super-
vision" the legislature had in mind when enacting §35-1-42. 
In the early case of ABgel^Yjt^lBdasiXial^CQIBmissiorjf 64 Utah 
105, 228 p. 509 (1924)f whose authority was more recently 
reaffirmed in S3ll£3fi3_YjL-5£liDSl>3IB t 21 Utah 2d 139
 f 442 P.2d 31 
(1968), this Court illustrated the difference between the control 
which is exercised over an independent contractor as distinguished 
from the control which an employer exercises over an employee. In 
I 
Ansel, the applicant, one Skoubye contracted with a general 
contractor to pour the foundation for an apartment building. The 
13 
Industrial Commission ruled that Skoubye was an employee of 
Angel, This Court reversed the Industrial Commission's rulingf 
and stated: 
In our opinion the applicant Skoubyef under 
the facts of the instant case, was not under 
the supervision and control of Angelf as 
contemplated in the first part of the statute, 
but his status was that of an independent 
contractor, as defined in the concluding 
sentences of the statute. Skoubye took the 
work at a price of so much per cubic foot. He 
saw the premises, knew the work he was 
required to dof and knewf approximately/ the 
quantity thereof. He was to employ his own 
help, fix their compensation and pay them out 
of the five cents per cubic foot, or, in any 
event. Angel was in no manner liable to 
anyone, except to pay Skoubye five cents per 
cubic foot for the work. Skoubye was master 
of his own time. He could be present and do 
nothing. He could be present and help the 
men, or he could go where he pleased, engage 
in other business if he desired, and was only 
responsible for the performance of the work in 
a workmanlike manner. This he was compelled 
to do in accordance with Angel's design, and 
as to this Angel had the right of super-
vision. When Angel or his foreman saw that 
the tamping was not being properly done, so as 
to result in a finished workmanlike job, he 
had the right to call attention to the fact, 
and perhaps it was his duty to do so, in order 
to avoid a plea of estoppel. What Angel and 
his foreman did, it will be noted, went 
directly to the point of effecting a proper 
result in accordance with Angel's design. The 
nature of the work was such that it should be 
a finished job as the work progressed; that is 
to say, every fact of the walls should be 
finished and completed in a workmanlike manner 
as the work progressed, and for that reason 
proper tamping before the cement hardened was 
vitally essential. This, in connection with 
showing the men where to commence, seems to be 
the extent of the supervision exercised by 
Angel and his foreman. If Skoubye had seen 
fit to convey the cement from the mixer to the 
building in buckets or other receptacles, 
instead of by wheelbarrows, as was done, it 
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would have been none of Angel's business, and 
Angel would have had no right to interfere. 
If one or more of the men had seen fit to 
work only one or two hours a day, instead of 
eight hours, which was supposed to constitute 
a day, it would have been no concern of 
Angel's. Nobody but Skoubye would have had 
the right to complain. 
We find in this case every element necessary 
to constitute an independent contractor, and 
not a single element necessary to constitute 
an employee, of Angel. An employee is a 
servant of his master. His master employs him 
and fixes the terms of his compensation. He 
can direct and control all of his movements in 
and about the work, and discharge him ad 
libitum, unless there is some special agreem-
ent which limits his authority. 
64 Utah at 111-112. 
It is evident from this discussion that a general contractor 
has the right, and perhaps the duty to insist that an independent 
contractor perform his job in a workmanlike manner and in accord-
ance with the owner or architect's design. Further, he may also 
require that a subcontractor perform his job within a certain time 
frame where time limitations are of the essence. However, this 
right of control is certainly distinguishable from that of an 
employer who may direct an employee specifically as to what method 
or means to employ in accomplishing the end result. 
The type of input which Jacobsen had in the construction 
project did not rise to the level of supervision or control 
contemplated by the statute. The supervision and control which 
Jacobsen retained amounted to no more than the same type of 
oversight which the architect and owner exercised over Ring when 
they visited the jobsite personally. Jacobsen's right to control 
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and supervise was confined to making sure that the entire remodel-
ing job was performed in a timely and workmanlike manner. 
Jacobsen retained absolutely no power to control or supervise the 
method or means by which the carpentry ends were to be attained. 
Therefore, it must be concluded that the first prong of the 
aforementioned two-prong test has not been met, and accordingly 
Jacobsen cannot be deemed a statutory employer of Bruce Ring or 
anyone working under Ring. 
B. THE PORTION OF WORK WHICH BRUCE RING 
PERFORMED WAS NOT A PART OR PROCESS IN 
THE TRADE OR BUSINESS OF DENNIS JACOBSEN. 
In accordance with Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-42 
(1953, as amended), for Dennis Jacobsen to be deemed a statutory 
employer of Bruce Ring, the work which Ring performed must be a 
"part or process in the trade or business11 of Jacobsen. It is 
appellants1 contention that the portion of work which Bruce Ring 
undertook as a subcontractor was not a part or process in the 
trade or business of Dennis Jacobsen. A case which supports this 
position is Leg j^^ Cheyrfii) Oil QQBS&ny, 565 P.2d 1128 (Utah 
1977). In Lee, plaintiffs brought a cause of action against 
defendant Chevron Oil Company for injuries sustained when a fuel 
storage tank in which they were cleaning exploded. At the time of 
the accident plaintiffs were employed by Oaks Construction 
Company. Oaks was engaged on an hourly basis to clean the 
storage tanks for defendant Chevron. Chevron was engaged in the 
business of producing, storing and transporting crude oil. The 
trial court held that Chevron was a statutory employer of the 
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plaintiffs and therefore plaintifffs exclusive remedy was 
workmanfs compensation. The sole issue on appeal was whether 
defendant was a statutory employer of plaintiffs within the 
provisions of Section 35-1-42. Plaintiffs conceded that defend-
ant had retained supervision and control over their work so as to 
fulfill the requirements of the first prong of the two-prong 
test. However, plaintiffs contended that the facts did not 
establish that the work of cleaning the storage tanks constituted 
a "part or process in the trade or business" of Chevron Oil 
Company. 
In discussing what constitutes a "part or process in the 
trade or business"f this Courtf citing with approval 1A Larson's 
Workmen's Compensation Lawf Section 49.12f stated: 
Thus the statute covers all situations in 
which the subcontracted work is such a part of 
the constructive employer's regular business 
operation as he would ordinarily accomplish 
with his own employees. 
565 P.2d at 1131. 
Accordingly/ for Bruce Ring's carpentry work to be considered 
a part or process in the trade or business of Dennis Jacobsen, the 
carpentry work undertaken by Ring must be work which Jacobsen 
ordinarily accomplished with his own employees. Such is not the 
case. In October of 1985f at the time of the injury to Mr. Pugh, 
Mr. Jacobsen had five different construction jobs in progress in 
which he was the general contractor. And on each of those five 
jobs, the carpentry work was subcontracted out. In factf 
Mr. Jacobsen received three carpentry bids! on the job in ques-
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tion. Mr. Ring was the successful law bidder. (R-90.) Thusf it 
annot be said that the carpentry work which Ring was engaged in 
was a part of Jacobsenfs business which was ordinarily 
accomplished by Jacobsen's own employees. 
Therefore, inasmuch as Jacobsen ordinarily contracted out the 
carpentry portion of his construction jobs, this very work which 
Ring was engaged in was not a "part or process in the trade or 
business" of Jacobsen. 
When the evidence is reviewed as it relates to the factors 
which by statute and judicial construction are dispositive of this 
issue, it is apparent that the Industrial Commission erred when it 
concluded that Dennis Jacobsen was a statutory employer of Bruce 
Ring. Because there is no statutory employer/employee relation-
ship between Mr. Jacobsen and Mr. Ring, it follows that Mr. Pugh, 
an employee of Ring, cannot be deemed to be an employee of 
Jacobsen. Therefore, Mr. Jacobsen/State Insurance Fund is 
not liable for the workmenfs compensation benefits due and owing 
to Mr. Pugh. 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED BY INCORRECTLY CON-
CLUDING THAT MR. JACOBSEN AS STATUTORY EMPLOYER, AND 
MR. RING AS COMMON LAW EMPLOYER, WERE JOINTLY AND 
SEVERALLY LIABLE TO AN EMPLOYEE FOR WORKERS COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS DUE AS A RESULT OF THE EMPLOYEES INJURY. 
The Industrial Commission found that Bruce Ring and Dennis 
Jacobsen/State Insurance Fund were jointly and severally liable to 
Mark Pugh for the worker's compensation benefits due as a result 
of Pugh's injury. Appellants take exception to this finding and 
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contend that even if Dennis Jacobsen is found to be a statutory 
employer, his liability is not joint and several along with the 
immediate employer Bruce Ring, but rather, Ring's liability is 
primary and Jacobsen's is secondary* 
This issue as to joint and several liability as opposed to 
primary and secondary liability regarding statutory and common law 
employers appears to be an issue of first impression in the State 
of Utah, and it is therefore helpful to consult outside authority. 
Concerning the trend of statutory liability, Professor Larson 
notes that the usual liability of a statutory employer is "second-
ary." Larson, HfixJsmgn^ s^ CsinpgBSaiifiD iSSr Section 49.11
 at 9-2. 
A case which supports this point of view is EQ3SI§~HJL~H&DSfin, 211 
Neb 132, 317 NW 2d 905 (1982). In Rogers, a shopping center owner 
who was deemed to be a statutory employer under Nebraska law, 
engaged an independent contractor to move its business and office 
equipment from Ralston, Nebraska, to a new location in Omaha. 
While in the course of employment, an employee of the independent 
contractor was injured, and subsequently sought compensation. 
Nebraska Rev. Stat. §48-116 (1978) provides that a statutory 
employer and the immediate employer shall be jointly and severally 
liable to pay the compensation provided for by the act. In 
deciding the liability of the respective parties, the Supreme 
Court of Nebraska stated: 
The joint and several liability imposed by §48-116 is 
for the sole benefit of the injured workman. Between 
the statutory employer and the actual employer, the 
liability of the actual employer is primary and that of 
the statutory employer is secondary. 
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317 NW.2d at 909 
See also Duffy_Brothers_Construction^ 207 
Neb, 360, 299 NW.2d 170 (1980). 
Another case from a different jurisdiction expressing the 
same point of view is SQUth Y^ WJJLJsiBSfiflr 576 P.2d 1173 (Okla 
1978). Heref Wilkinson was injured while employed as a carpenter 
for Built-Rite Homes. Built-Rite was a sub-contractor on a 
project in which L.V.S. Builders was the general contractor. 
Built-Rites workmenfs compensation insurance was not in force on 
the date of Wilkinsonfs injury. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
sustained the award given by the State Industrial Court holding 
that Built-Rite must be primarily liable for any compensation due 
its direct employee - Wilkinson, and that L.V.S. as statutory 
employer, incurred secondary liability. The holding in this case 
was in accordance with 85.0.S. 1971 §11 which implies primary and 
secondary liability by stating in pertinent part: 
Where compensation is awarded against the principal 
employer . . . such award shall not preclude the 
principal employer form recovering the same . . . from 
any independent contractor, intermediate contractor, or 
subcontractor whose duty it was to provide security for 
the payment of such compensation . . . 
Missouri is another jurisdiction which has seen fit to impose 
primary liability upon the most immediate employer, and secondary 
liability upon the more remote statutory employer. 
In the case of Arjdgisfiii y^Stsmrt> 391 S.W.2d 839 (Mo.-
1965) , Moeller Construction Company was the general contractor in 
the construction of a church. Moeller subcontracted the lathing 
and plastering work on the church to John Steurer. Another party, 
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George Stroup Lathing Company actually performed the lathing work 
on the job for Steurer. Steurer then <J3id the plastering. The 
plaintiffr Andersonf was a lather employed by Stroup Lathing 
Company and was injured when a scaffold collapsed. In determining 
the liability of the parties involved, th£ Missouri Supreme Court 
referred to Section 287.040(4) Revised Statutes of Missouri, 
which sets forth: 
In all cases mentioned in the preceding subsections, the 
immediate contractor or subcontractor shall be liable as 
an employer of the employees of his subcontractors 
. . . The liability of the immediate employer shall be 
primary, and that of the others secondary in their 
order, and any compensation paid by those secondarily 
liable may be recovered from those primarily liable, 
with attorneys fees and expenses of the suit . . . . No 
such employer shall be liable as in this section 
provided if the employee was insured by his immediate 
or any intermediate employer. 
In reference to this statute, the Court stated: 
It is clear that the statute makes the immediate 
(direct) employer of the injured! employee primarily lia-
ble for compensation, and makes the intermediate 
subcontractor or subcontractors and finally the princi-
pal contractor secondarily liabl |e "in their order." In 
on an ascending scale. other words, this liability is| 
Applied to the instant case, the primary liability to 
plaintiff was that of Stroup. Iif Stroup had not carried 
insurance, the next one responsible for compensation 
would have been Steurer, and finally Moeller. 
391 S.W.2d at 845 
Another case which had a similar resu{Lt as the above 3 cases, 
but which did not rely upon statutory interpretation in reaching 
the r e s u l t , i s j2i}A§SB~YjL_Mfil££D3SDr 147 k 705 (Conn. 1929) . The 
claim made on behalf of Johnson was that, jalthough he as general 
contractor and Mortenson as subcontractor were both, without 
i 
distinction as between them, liable for compensation to Mor-
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tenson's employeef the obligation to pay compensation was pri-
marily that of Mortenson, the immediate employer of the injured 
workman, and the situation of the general contractor was such as 
to entitle him to reimbursement by such immediate employer, for 
compensation payments to which he was subjected by reason of the 
award. In determining the liability as between the general 
contractor Johnson, and the subcontractor Mortensen, the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut stated: 
The answers to the questions reserved must be 
sought, not through construction of or 
implication from our Workmen1s Compensation 
Act, but by application of general principles 
growing out of the relations, to each other, 
of the parties to this action and the 
situation resulting from the application of 
section 5345, as between them, on the one 
hand, and the claimants on the other. 
Pascoal's contract of employment with 
Mortenson gave him no right to recover wages 
from Johnson, and the latter had no power of 
direction over him. The presence of section 
5345 in the act evinces, of itself, that no 
relation exists between a contractor and the 
employee of a subcontractor which, unaided by 
the provisions of this section, would involve 
any right to compensation from the contractor 
as an employer of the claimant. The fact 
that, for the limited purpose of attainment of 
the object of that section, he is made subject 
to a like liability as the actual employer of 
the injured workman, does not alter their 
status and relations, or abolish the logical 
distinctions between them, when the object of 
the statute has been served and rights are to 
be determined which the statute does not 
create or affect. . . . 
As between Johnson and worcenson, the 
liability of the latter should be regarded as 
primary and that of the former as secondary 
only. 
147 A. at 708. 
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Thus, in light of the foregoing authority, it is appellants1 
contention that the Utah Supreme Court should adopt the majority 
viewpoint and hold Bruce Ring, the claimant's immediate employer, 
primarily liable and impose only secondary liability upon the 
statutory employer, Dennis Jacobsen. Sucn a holding would be fair 
and equitable as the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act 
would be fulfilled. 
The purpose of Section 35-1-42 ik to protect employees of 
irresponsible and uninsured subcontractors by imposing ultimate 
liability on the presumably responsible principal contractor. 
fiBier_Constructipn_Cgmpan^ 678 P.2d 305 (Utah 1984)• 
In the case at bar this purpose will be fulfilled if Bruce Ring is 
held primarily liable and Dennis Jacobsen/state Insurance Fund are 
held secondarily liable. If Bruce Ring and any and all of his 
sureties are unable to pay the compensation due, then Dennis 
Jacobsen/State Insurance Fund will incur tjhe ultimate liability as 
between the two of them. Thus, the injured employee is 
protected. It is merely a matter of looking to those who are more 
immediately responsible first. 
POINT III 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED BY INCORRECTLY CONCLUD-
ING THAT JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY EXISTED BETWEEN 
BRUCE RING AND DENNIS JACOBSEN/STATE INSURANCE FUND 
WHILE FAILING TO INVOLVE THE UNINSURED EMPLOYER'S FUND 
(FORMERLY DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND). 
It is appellants1 contention that the Industrial Commission 
erred by failing to impose any liability upon the Default 
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Indemnity Fund (Uninsured Employers Fund)• The Utah Legislature 
saw fit to create a Default Indemnity Fund (Uninsured Employers 
Fund) for the purpose of paying and assuring the payment of 
benefits to employees of insolvent employers* Specifically, Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-107 (1953f as amended), states in 
part: 
There is created an Uninsured Employers1 Fund 
for the purpose of paying and assuring, to 
persons entitled to workers1 compensation 
benefits when every employer of the claimant 
who is found to be individually, jointly, or 
severally liable becomes or is insolvent, 
appoints or has appointed a receiver, or 
otherwise does not have sufficient funds, 
insurance, sureties, or other security to 
cover workers1 compensation liabilities under 
this chapter. This fund succeeds to all 
monies previously held in the Default 
Indemnity Fund. If it becomes necessary to 
pay benefits, the fund is liable for all 
obligations of the employer as set forth in 
Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35, with the exception 
of penalties on those obligations. (See 
§35-1-107 in its entirety attached hereto as 
Appendix 1.) 
Thus, it is appellants1 position that in light of this 
statute, the Default Indemnity Fund (Uninsured Employers Fund) 
stands in the shoes of Bruce Ring and is liable before the 
statutory employer, Dennis Jacobsen. That is, the Default 
Indemnity Fund (Uninsured Employers Fund) acts as a surety for any 
defaulting employer. If the liability of the Default Indemnity 
Fund (Uninsured Employers Fund) were bypassed, and all 
responsibility were placed upon the statutory employer, this would 
have the effect of placing a double burden on a responsible 
employer who obtains workers1 compensation insurance coverage and 
24 
who thereby contributes to the funding I structure of the Default 
Indemnity Fund (Uninsured Employers Funj3) . [See §35-1-68 (2) (a) 
U.C.A. and 31A-3-201(2)(a)(b) in Appendices 2 and 3 attached 
hereto on how the employers pay the benefits provided by the 
Uninsured Employers1 Fund.] It would i?e inequitable to require 
such a responsible employer first to pay into the Default Indem-
nity Fund (Uninsured Employers Fund), and then be found liable as 
a statutory employer and be forced to pay!a claim. 
Although this issue has not been ruled on by the Utah Supreme 
Court, other jurisdictions have handed 4 0 w n decisions in accord-
ance with appellants1 contention. 
In Davis„v.._Gopdin, 639 S.W. 2d 38 (Ky App. 1982)
 f the 
custodian of the Uninsured Employers Fund appealed from a judgment 
holding the fund liable due to the default of one of workers1 
compensation claimants co-employers. The Court of Appeals held 
that a default in payment of a workersf| compensation award by 
co-employers had to be obtained against all those primarily 
liable. Thusf the Court held that the fund's liability comes into 
play after execution is unsatisfied against those individuals who 
have primary responsibility. 
This holding of the Kentucky Court of Appeals is in accord 
with the Kentucky Supreme Court case of XQeQB^x^Q&mshgll r 536 
S.W. 2d 470 (Ky 1976) which stated that the Uninsured Employers 
Fund is like a surety of the uninsured employer. The YQSQSJ Court 
statedf "Like a surety it has no duty to pay at least until the 
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principal, here the employerf either fails to pay or is unable to 
pay." 536 S.W. 2d at 471. 
Another jurisdiction which has held that the Uninsured 
Employers Fund is to act as a surety for a defaulting uninsured 
employer is fiaxih S^QaSS&L, 357 NYS 2d 46, 45 A.D. 2d 161 
(1974). There the Court stated: 
Subdivision 1 of Section 26(a) provides upon 
the failure of an employer to pay an award, 
"then and in such event . . . [unless review 
or appeal is sought as set forth in the 
statute] . . . the award shall be payable out 
of the fund . . . " Thus the Fund is a 
creature of statute whose duty to pay an award 
does not depend upon the making of an award, 
but only upon the failure to pay an award 
which has previously been properly rendered, 
making it in effect a surety. 
357 NYS 2d at 48. 
Accordinglyf applying Utah Code Annotatedf Section 35-1-107 
to the case at bar, and taking into consideration the foregoing 
cases, it is apparent that the Uninsured Employers Fund is to act 
as a surety for those defaulting employers who are found primarily 
liable. Thus, it is appellants' contention that because Bruce 
Ring is the only party primarily liable to Mr. Pugh, and the 
Uninsured Employers Fund is to act as a surety for a lone default-
ing party, the Uninsured Employers Fund steps in the shoes of 
Mr. Ring and incurs primary liability. 
Then, assuming that Jacobsen is a statutory employer, 
Jacobsen and the State Insurance Fund should be placed in a 
position of secondary liability only if nonpayment by Ring and the 
Uninsured Employers Fund occurs. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants1 herein respectfully request that the Utah Supreme 
Court provide the relief and find as a matter of law as follows: 
1. The Order of the Industrial Commission which held 
that a statutory employer/employee relationship existed between 
Dennis Jacobsen and Bruce Ring should be reversed so as to relieve 
Dennis Jacobsen/State Insurance Fund of any liability for compen-
sation benefits to Mark Pugh. The relationship was that of a 
general contractor to an independent contractor who was performing 
a service that was not a part or process of the trade or business 
of Dennis Jacobsen. 
2. In the alternative, if the Court believes that Dennis 
Jacobsen is a statutory employer, the Dennis Jacobsen/State 
Insurance Funds liability should be secondary to that of Bruce 
Ring, the actual employer. 
3. Dennis Jacobsen/State Insurance F^ ind is obligated to pay 
compensation benefits only if Ring and ^he Uninsured Employer's 
Fund are insolvent. 
DATED this £L_ day of October, 1986. 
BLACK & MOORE 
James R. Black 
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APPENDIX 1 
§35-1 -107 U.C.A. 
ocr-x-Av/i. uninsured j&mpioyers' Fund -4 Creation — Li-
ability — Funding — Administration — Subro-
gation — Insolvent employer «+-, Fund's rights 
with wrongful act or neglect — Adjusting 
claims — Duty to notify — Penalty — Assess-
ment of self-insured employers, I—* •-
(1) There is created an Uninsured Employers' Fund for the purpose of 
paying and assuring, to persons entitled to workers' compensation benefits 
when every employer of the claimant who is found to be individually, 
jointly, or severally liable becomes or is insolvent,'appoints or has ap-
pointed a receiver, or otherwise does not have sufficient funds, insurance, 
sureties, or other security to cover workers' compensation liabilities under 
this chapter. This fund succeeds to all monies previously held in the De-
fault Indemnity Fund. If it becomes necessary to pay benefits, the fund is 
liable for all obligations of the employer as set forth in Chapters 1 and 2, 
Title 35, with the exception of penalties on those obligations. 
(2) Funds for the Uninsured Employers' Fund shall be provided pursuant 
to Subsections 35-1-68 (2) (a) and 31A-3-l!01 (2). The Jtate treasurer is the 
custodian of the Uninsured Employers' Fund and the commission shall 
direct its distribution. Reasonable costs of administration may be paid from 
the fund. The commission shall employ counsel to represent the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund in all proceedings brought to enforce claims against or on 
behalf of the fund, and upon the request of the commission, the attorney 
general, city attorney, or county attorney of the locality in which any inves-
tigation, hearing, or trial under the provisions of this title is pending, or in 
which the employee resides or an employer resides or is doing business, 
shall aid in the representation of the fund. f ''\ 
(3) To the extent of the compensation and other benefits paid or payable 
to or on behalf of an employee or their dependents from the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund, the fund, by subrogation, has all the rights, powers, and 
benefits of the employee or their dependents against the employer failing to 
make the compensation payments. » • T 
(4) The receiver, trustee, liquidator, or statutory successor of an insol-
vent employer is bound by settlements of covered claims by the fund. The 
court having jurisdiction shall grant all payments made under this section 
a priority equal to that to which the claimant would have been entitled in 
the absence of this section against the assets of the insolvent employer. The 
expenses of the fund in handling claims shall be accorded the same priority 
as the liquidator's expenses. ' i* 
(5) The commission shall periodically file with the receiver, trustee,* or 
liquidator of the insolvent employer or insurance carrier statements of the 
covered claims paid by the fund and estimates of anticipated claims against 
the fund which shall preserve the rights of the fund for claims against the 
assets of the insolvent employer. 
(6) When any iiyury or death for which compensation is payable from the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund has been caused by the wrongful act or neglect 
of another person not in the same employment, the fund has the same 
rights as allowed under § 35-1-62. 
(7) The fund, subject to approval of the Workers' Compensation Division 
of the Industrial Commission, shall discharge its obligations by adjusting 
its own claims or by contracting with an adjusting company, risk manage-
ment company, insurance company, or other company) that has expertise 
and capabilities in adjusting and paying workers' compensation claims. «-
(8) For the purpose of maintaining this fund, the commission, upon renr 
dering a decision with respect to any claim for benefits under this chapter, 
shall impose a penalty against the uninsured employer of 15% of the value 
of the total award in connection with the claim, and shall direct'that the 
additional penalty be paid into the Uninsured Employers' Fund/ Awards 
may be docketed as other awards under this chapter. • 
treasurer, with respect to payment of any compensation Denents, expenses, 
fees, or disbursement properly chargeable against the fund, is limited to 
the assets in the fund, and they are not otherwise in any way liable for the 
making of any payment. 
(10) The commission may make reasonable rules, fot'the processing and 
payment of claims for compensation from the fund. 
(11) In the event it becomes necessary for the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund to pay benefits pursuant to the provisions of this section to any em-
ployee of an insolvent self-insured employer, the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund may assess all other self-insured employers amounts necessary to pay 
(a) the obligations of the fund subsequent to an insolvency, (b) the expenses 
of handling covered claims subsequent to an insolvency, (c) the cost of 
examinations under Subsection (12), and (d) other expenses authorized by 
this section. The assessments of each self-insured employer shall be in the 
proportion that the manual premium of the self-insured employer for the 
preceding calendar year bears to the manual premium of all self-insured 
employers for the preceding calendar year. Each self-insured employer 
shall be notified of his assessment not later than 30 days before it is due. 
No self-insured employer may be assessed in any year an amount greater 
than 2% of that self-insured employer's manual premium for the preceding 
calendar year. If the maximum assessment does not provide in any one year 
an amount sufficient to make all necessary payments from the fund for one 
or more insolvent self-insured employers, the unpaid portion shall be paid 
as soon as funds become available. All self-insured employers are liable 
under this section for a period not to exceed three years after the self-
insured employer's voluntary or involuntary termination of self-insurance 
privileges within this state. This subsection does not apply to claims made 
against an insolvent self-insured employer if the insolvency occurred prior 
to July 1,1986. ' ••> 
(12) It is the duty of all self-insured employers to notify the Industrial 
Commission of any information indicating that any self-insured employer 
may be insolvent or in a financial condition hazardous to its employees or 
the public. Upon receipt of that notification and with good cause appearing, 
the Industrial Commission may order an examination of that self-insured 
employer. The cost of the examination shall be assessed against all self-
insured employers as provided in Subsection (11). The,results of the exami-
nation shall be kept confidential. J fi ^ 
History: C. 1953, 35-1-107, enacted by L. 
1984, ch. 77, § 1; 1986, ch. 211, § 12. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment, effective July 1,1986, in Subsection (1) 
before "becomes" and inserted "or is" after 
"becomes" in the first sentence, inserted the 
second sentence, added "with the exception of 
penalties on those obligations" at the end of 
the last sentence, and made minor word 
changes; in Subsection (2) added "and 
31A-3-201(2)M at the end of the first sentence, 
substituted "commission" for "attorney gen-
eral", substituted "employ counsel" for "ap-
point a member of his staff', added "and upon 
the request of the commission, the attorney 
general, city attorney, or county attorney of 
the locality in which any investigation, hear-
ing, or trial under the provisions of this title 
is pending, or in which the employee resides 
substituted "Uninsured Employers' Fund" for 
"Default Indemnity Fund" wherever it ap-
pears; inserted "of the claimant who is found 
to be individually, jointly, or severally liable" 
or an employer resides or is doing business, 
shall aid in the representation of the fund," 
at the end of the fourth sentence, and made 
stylistic changes; made stylistic changes in 
Subsections (3), (4), (7), and (10); in the first 
sentence of Subsection (8) deleted "from the 
Default Indemnity Fund" following "claim," 
substituted "benefits" for "compensation" fol-
lowing "for", inserted "uninsured" before 
"employer" and "value of the" before "total", 
deleted "made" following "award'1, inserted 
"in connection with" following "in", and in-
serted "Uninsured Employers"' before 
"Fund"; and added Subsections (11) and (12). 
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APPENDIX 2 
§35-1-68 (2)(a) U.C.AJ 
(2) If injury causes death within the period of six yea^s from the date oi 
the accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall $ay the burial ex-
penses of the deceased as provided in § 35-1-81, and further benefits in the 
amounts and to the persons as follows: 
(a) If the commission has made a determination that there are no 
dependents of the deceased, it may, prior to a lapse of one year from the 
date of death of a deceased employee, issue a temporary order for the 
employer or insurance carrier to pay into the Uninsured Employers' 
Fund the sum of $30,000. When the amount in tl^ e Uninsured Em-
ployers' Fund reaches or exceeds $500,000, the $30,000 shall thereafter 
be paid into the Second Injury Fund. If the amount in the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund falls below $500,000 at any time ^fter reaching the 
initial $500,000, the commission shall direct payments into either the 
Second Injury Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund as may be 
required so as to maintain the Uninsured Employers' Fund at or near 
$500,000. Before payment into either fund, the $30,000 shall be re-
duced by the amount of any weekly compensation payments paid to or 
due the deceased between the date of the accident and death. If a 
dependency claim is filed subsequent to the issuance of such an order 
and, thereafter, a determination of dependency is ma i^e by the commis-
sion, the award shall first be paid out of the sum deposited for credit to 
the Uninsured Employers' Fund or the Second Injury Fund by the 
employer or insurance carrier before any further claii^ i may be asserted 
against the employer or insurance carrier. If no dependency claim is 
filed within one year from the date of death, the coihmission's tempo-
rary order shall become permanent and final. If no temporary order 
has been issued and no claim for dependency has beeki filed within one 
year from the date of death, the commission may i^sue a permanent 
order at any time requiring the carrier or employer t^ pay $30,000 into 
the Second Injury Fund. Any claim for compensation by a dependent 
must be filed with the commission within one year from the date of 
death of the deceased. 
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(2) (a) Every admitted insurer writing workers' compensation insurance 
in this state, including the Workers' Compensation fund of Utah under 
Chapter 3, Title 35, shall pay to the state tax commission, on or before 
March 31 in each year, a tax of between 3V4% and 3l/4% of the total 
premiums received by it from workers' compensation insurance in this 
state during the preceding calendar year. The percentage of premium 
applicable in any given year shall be determined by the Industrial 
Commission at least 90 days prior to the payment date, and any per-
centage of premium over 3lU% shall reflect the reasonable reserves 
necessary to maintain the Uninsured Employers' Fund provided for in 
§ 35-1-107 in an actuarially sound financial condition. This taxable 
premium shall be reduced in the same manner as provided in Subsec-
tions (l)(a) and (1Kb), but not as provided in Subsection (l)(c). The 
State Tax Commission shall remit from the tax collected under this 
subsection an amount equal to 3% of the premium to the Second Injury 
Fund created under Subsection 35-1-68(1), lUfo of the premium to the 
General Fund, and any remaining applicable percentage of the pre-
mium to the Uninsured Employers' Fund created under § 35-1-107. No 
tax that is to be transferred into the General Fund may be collected on 
premiums received from Utah public agencies 
(b) Effective July 1, 1987, the variable tax provided in Subsection 
(2)(a) shall be replaced by a flat tax of 3V4%. 
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THE IHDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 85000966 
MARK PUGH, 
Applicant, 
vs. /C'£-*~ 
BRUCE RING (Uninsured); 
DENNIS JACOBSEN and/or 
STATE INSURANCE FUND; and 
DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission, of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on Harch 19, 
1986, at 1:00 p.m.; same being pursuant to Order and 
Notice of the Commission. 
Richard G« Sumsion. Administrative Law Judsce. 
The Applicant was present and represented by Phillip 
B. Shell, Attorney at Law. 
The Defendant Bruce Ring was represented by Joseph C. 
Foley, Attorney at Law. 
The Defendants Dennis Jacobsen and/or State Insurance 
Fund were represented by Dennis.V. Lloyd, Attorney at 
Law. 
The Defendant Default Indemnity Fund was represented 
by Suzan Pixton, Administrator. 
The principal issue in this case is whether the case is subject to 
the provisions of Section 35-1-42, U.C.A. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. It is uncontroverted that the Applicant, Mark Pugh, was employed 
as a laborer/carpentervs helper by Bruce Ring at $5.50 an hour. ' His average 
weekly wage is controverted, and there are no payroll records'available that 
would assist the Commission in a more precise determination of the Applicant's 
weekly wage, but Mr. Ring certified that he paid the Applicant a total of 
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$1,353.50 over a ten-week period. Because the Applicant started at $5.00 an 
hour and was earning $5.50 an hour at the time of his injury, it is reasonable 
to assume that he was averaging about thirty hours a week. Consequently, the 
Administrative Law Judge finds in the absence of more precise documentation 
that the Applicant's average weekly wage at the time of his injury was $165.00 
a week. 
2. The Applicant's industrial accident is not controverted. He and 
Mr. Ring were on ladders in the process of putting up a beam. He tried to 
move the ladder a little bit to get in a better position, but the ladder 
slipped, causing him to fall. Just as the Applicant was trying to get up 
after his fall, Mr. Ring fell on him. The Applicant immediately experienced 
numbness in his right arm and had pain in his neck. 
3. The Applicant went to the Veterans Administration Hospital the 
next morning, where his neck was x-rayed and he was informed that he needed 
surgery. A cervical fusion was performed on October 7. The Applicant was off 
work until January 1, 1986, when he obtained employment doing janitorial work. 
A. The Applicant is currently working and has apparently had a good 
result from his surgery. He indicates that his doctor believes it is still 
too early to assign a permanent partial impairment rating* 
5. The evidence is cl^ar^ that the Applicant was employed by 
Bruce Ring, who was working as a subcontractor on a job for Dennis Jacobsen, 
the general contractor. This was a residential construction job involving an 
addition to a house located on the avenues. Mr. Ring had submitted a bid on 
this job in accordance with the blueprints and specifications and was the 
successful low bidder. He had hired the Applicant to assist him in the com-
pletion of this project. It appears rather clear from the testimony given at 
the time of hearing that Mr. Ring had formerly been employed by Mr. Jacobsen 
as an employee but in recent months had been working as a subcontractor on 
various jobs obtained by Mr. Jacobsen. 
6. It was Mr. Jacobsen1s practice to subcontract approximately 
80 percent of the work involved in a given job that he took on as a general 
contractor. Neither Mr. Ring nor Mr. Jacobsen are journeyman carpenters, but 
both have worked a number of years learning the construction trade on an 
on-the-job basis. There is no evidence that Mr. Jacobsen was any more 
proficient as a carpenter than Mr. Ring. In fact, Mr. Jacobsen testified that 
in his own opinion Mr« Ring if anything was more proficient than he was. It 
is also clear from the record that Mr. Ring was working from blueprints and 
specifications and that he had bid this job on a contract basis. It is clear 
that no employee-employer relationship exists at this time between 
Mr. Jacobsen and Mr. Ring, and it is equally clear that an employee-employer 
relationship did exist between Mr« Ring and the Applicant*| As an uninsured 
employer, Mr. Ring is in no way freed from the responsibilities placed upon 
him under the Workers' Compensation Act as an employer. He is personally 
liable to the Applicant for the benefits provided under the Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
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Discussion 
The primary issue presented to the Commission in this case is whether 
or not the Defendant Dennis Jacobsen is jointly and severally liable with 
Bruce Ring for the compensation due the Applicant under the provisions of 
Section 35-1-42, U.C.A. This Section recognizes a responsibility on the part 
of employers generally to provide protection to employees who may sustain 
on-the-job injuries as a result of an industrial accident. The statute does 
not change the legal relationship of employee-employer but does impose 
statutory liability in certain cases where the 
employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part for 
him by a contractor over whose work he retains supervision or 
control, and such work is a part or process in the trade or 
business of the employer . . . . (Section 35-1-42, U.C.A.) 
I 
In this case, there is no doubt that the subcontract work being done by 
Mr. Ring was part or process in the trade or business of Mr. Jacobsen as the 
general contractor. The statute extends coverage! to 
all persons employed by him [the general contractor], and all 
subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by any 
such subcontractors . . . . (Section 35-1-42, U.C.A.) 
The basic philosophy of the statutory employer statutes enacted in most states 
is 
to protect employees of irresponsible and uninsured sub-
contractors by imposing ultimate liability on the presumably 
responsible principal contractor, who has it within his 
power, in choosing subcontractors, to pass upon their 
responsibility and insist upon appropriate compensation 
protection for their workers. (Se^ Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation Law. Section 49.11 at 9-12 [1982].) 
In the recent case of Pinter Construction Company v. Clifford P. Frisby. 678 
P.2d 305 (1984), the Utah Supreme Court quoted with approval a statement made 
by the Arizona Supreme Court that 
[this section] is a legislatively created scheme by which 
conceded non-employees are deliberately brought within the 
coverage of the [Workmen*s Compensation] Act. 
In the Frisby case, the Court also quoted with 
Nochta v. Industrial Commission, 7 Ariz. App. 
which it stated: 
approval the Arizona case of 
166, 436 P.2d 944 (1968). in 
The evidence is clear in the instant case that the respondent 
construction company exercised that degree of control over 
:he job to be performed by the petitioner sufficient to bring 
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petitioner within the meaning of Section 23-902, subsec. B. 
They provided the material that he was to use; the job 
superintendent together with the architect made inspections 
of the job and there were consultations; but the final and 
exclusive control of the job was vested in the job super-
intendent. The fact that petitioner was knowledgeable and 
trusted in his field does not lessen the ultimate control 
over the job by the job superintendent. 
There is no evidence that Jacobsen provided any material used by Ring 
in this job, but in all other respects the foregoing case is analogous to the 
instant case. Ring testified that he considered himself to be totally subject 
to the control of Jacobsen in the completion of this project. This was not 
because he looked to Jacobsen for expertise on how to do the jobf but that the 
ultimate job had to be performed to the satisfaction of the owner and the 
architect and that there was almost daily input by Jacobsen in this regard and 
in regard to the ultimate completion of the project. 
7. In keeping with the perceived application of the Frisby case to 
the facts of the instant case, the Administrative Law Judge finds there was 
sufficient direction and control on the part of Jacobsen to render Ring and 
his employees "statutory employees" under the provisions of Section 35-1-42. 
The Administrative Law Judge acknowledges that this decision might well be 
inconsistent with the Court's decj.sipn in the Graham case rendered just two 
weeks prior to the Frisby decision; but because the Frisby decision is the 
latter of the two, the Administrative Law Judge presumes that it reflects the 
prevailing opinion of the Utah Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The Applicant is entitled to workers* compensation benefits from the 
Defendant Bruce Ring in accordance with the foregoing Findings of Fact. The 
Defendant Dennis Jacobsen is jointly and severally liable for the payment of 
these benefits as a statutory employer under the provisions of Section 
35-1-42. If the Defendant Ring is unable to comply with the provisions of 
this Order within ten days from the date hereof, the Defendant Jacobsen and/or 
the State Insurance Fund will be liable for payment of the same with a right 
of subrogation against the Defendant Ring for reimbursement. Any determina-
tion of permanent partial impairment should be deferred until the Applicant's 
condition has been certified and a permanent partial impairment rating 
solicited from his treating physician or provided as a result of some other 
independent evaluation. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendant Bruce Ring pay Applicant 
compensation at the rate of $165.00 per week for thirteen weeks or a total of 
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$2,145.00 as compensation for temporary total disability resulting from the 
Applicant's industrial accident of October 2, 1&85, and interest at 8 percent 
per annum in the sum of $73.92- | 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant Bruce Ring pay all medical 
expenses incurred as the result of this accident, said expenses to be paid in 
accordance with the Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of this Commission. 
Said expenses pertain solely to medical expenses and do not include charges 
for nursing home facilities which the Applicant was provided. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant Bruce Ring pay to Phillip B. 
Shell the sum of $429.00 as an interim attorney's fee for services rendered in 
this proceeding, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid award. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a determination of the Applicant's 
permanent partial impairment, if any, be deferred until his condition has 
stabilized and a rating has.been provided. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the e\ient the Defendant Bruce Ring 
fails to comply with the provisions of this Ordfcr within ten days of the date 
hereof, that all amounts payable by said Defendant shall be paid by the 
Defendant Dennis Jacobsen and/or the State Insurance Fund with full rights of 
subroga- tion against the Defendant Bruce Ring for reimbursement. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (1$) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors ai>d objections, and unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Richard G. Sumsion 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
&&** day of March, 1986. 
ATTEST: 
Linda J. Strasburg / / 
Commission Secretary 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on March Jh 1986, a copy of the attached Order 
in the case of Mark Pugh issued March /^/ 1986, was mailed to the 
following persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Suzan Pixton, Administrator 
Default Indemnity Fund 
P.O. Box 45580 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580 
Joseph C. Foley, Attorney at Law * 
543 - 25th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Dennis Jacobsen 
1688 Blaine Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Dennis V. Lloyd, Attorney at Law 
Utah State Insurance Fund 
P.O. Box 45420 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-1420 
Mark Pugh 
614 West North Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Bruce Ring 
P.O. box 913 
Sandy, UT 84091 
Phillip B. Shell, Attorney at Law 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, UT 84107 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By 
DeAnn Seely Ir 
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DENNIS V. LLOYD, No. 1984 
Attorney for Defendants 
P.O. Box 45420 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0420 
Tel: 533-7840 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 85000966 
MARK PUGHf * 
Applicant, * 
vs * 
* MOTION FOR REVIEW 
BRUCE RING'(Uninsured); * 
DENNIS JACOBSEN and/or * 
STATE INSURANCE FUND; and * 
DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
COMES NOW, Dennis Jacobsen and/or State Insurance Fund,'defendants 
in the above referenced matter, to file a Motion For Review of the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order entered by the Administrative Law 
Judge, March 26, 1986. Leave was granted the defendants to submit their 
Motion For Review 15 days after receipt of the transcript of hearing. Said 
transcript was received on April 7, 1986. 
Defendants seek a review of the Administrative Law uuaue s Order in 
two regards: 
1. Contrary to the preponderance of evidence, the Administrative 
Law Judge incorrectly concluded that there was a statutory employer/employee 
relationship between Bruce Ring and Dennis Jacobsen. 
2. The Administrative Law Judge improperly ordered'joint and 
several liability between Bruce Ring and Dennis Jacobsen and/or State 
Insurance Fund while failing to involve the Default Indemnity Fund. 
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In his March 26, 1986 Order, the Administrative Law Jjjc|geicjejurjly• : : : 
found that Mark Pugh was employed by Bruce Ring, a sub-contracttfr,#ofl#a* •• • • 
residential construction job where Dennis Jacobsen was the general 
contractor. The Administrative Law Judge then attempted to apply the facts 
of this case to the provisions of Utah Code Anno., Sec. 35-1-42. In 
pertinent part, Section 42 states: 
Where any employer procures any work to be done 
wholly or in part for him by a contractor over whose 
work he retains supervision or control, and such work 
is a part or process in the trade or business of the 
employer, such contractor, and all person employed by 
him, and all sub-contractors under him, and all 
persons employed by any such sub-contractors, shall 
be deemed, within the meaning of this section, 
employees of such original employer. 
The test outlined in this statute has recently been applied by the 
Utah Supreme Court in such cases as L. Jack Graham v. R. Thorne Foundation 
and State Insurance Fund, 675 P.2d 1196 (1984), and Pinter Construction Co. 
v. Clifford P. Frizby, 678 P.2d 305 (1984). The test is used as the 
bellwether of a statutory employer/employee relationship giving rise to an 
entitlement to workers compensation benefits under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
Concerning the first prong of this test, the Administrative Law 
Judge found, in the case at hand: 
Ring testified that he considered himself to be 
totally subject to control of Jacobsen in the 
completion of this project. This was not because 
he looked to Jacobsen for expertise on how to do 
the job, but that the ultimate job had to be 
performed to the satisfaction of the owner and the 
architect and that there was almost daily input by 
Jacobsen in this regard and in regard to the 
ultimate completion of the project. 
Order, page 4. 
Defendants believe that this finding relies inappropriately on Ring's $ 
opinion of his relationship with Jacobsen and is clearly contrary to the 
weight of objective evidence found in the record. At hearing, Ring admitted 
45 IK 
<i 
/ • •-
0# 
• 
POINT ONE 
• • • 
• • • • 
• • • • • • 
Motion For Review 
Re: Mark Pugh 
Page 3 
that Jacobsen, as the general contractor, was responsible for the timely #id
 # 
workman-like completion of the entire remodeling project. (Trfnjc/jiijt; page; : 
35) However, Jacobsen did not exercise direct supervision or joptrpt W$r • J I 
Ring's carpentry work. Ring was free to work on jobs for othef tjerfefal* •• • 
contractors. (Transcript, page 35) Jacobsen did not direct Ring as to a time 
to start work or stop work. (Transcript, page 50) Ring provided his own 
tools and all the tools for Pugh. (Transcript, page 34) Jacobsen did no 
actual carpentry work himself. (Transcript, page 35) Jacobsen did not show 
Ring or Pugh how to accomplish any specific carpentry task. (Record, page 
57) In fact, Jacobsen candidly indicated that Ring had far better carpentry 
skills than Jacobsen. (Transcript, page 56) Ring admitted that, while he 
would give deference to Jacobsen's opinion, Jacobsen had no right to hire or 
fire Ring's employees. (Transcript, page 36) 
As stated above, the only input Jacobseh had regarding Ring's work 
was as that sub-contracting job related to the completion of the entire 
project or, in some instances, changes requested by the architect or the 
owner. It 1s important to note regarding the latter that the architect and 
the owner sometimes went directly to Ring to affect changes in the plan 
bypassing Jacobsen altogether. (Transcript, pag|5 51) In his testimony, Ring 
described this relationship as follows: 
Q. Do you recall at any time Mr. jacobsen giving you 
specific instructions on how to do any part of 
that particular job? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What were you working on? 
A. You're looking for specifics, t guess? 
Mr* Foley: Speak up. We can't hear you. 
A. Well, suggestions were made da^ly — or when 
Dennis would come around, and Whenever we would 
meet. We would talk about progress to date and 
futuristic construction on thai project. 
The Court: Now that was - - now I would assume that 
would just be in the nature of "how's the 
job coming" and "how ar^ things 
progressing" and so forth. Is that what 
you're referring to? 
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A. Not necessarily. 'Cause he could see that 
visually. 
Q. Okay. 
A. So our discussions were instructural, and maybe 
what was next — what phase was next, and what 
was important for the contractor so he could get 
other subs in behind me. 
Q. And did he make suggestions as to what was next? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you feel any obligation to follow his 
suggestions? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he also give you specific instructions on how 
to do a specific thing — without referring to 
detail now — but was that the general 
characteristic of his conversations, or they yery 
general questions? 
A. Td say they were more general — knowing that 
he has faith in me and - -
Q. And he'd say things like "put up this wall" or 
"lay down this deck," or something of that 
nature, in a very general sense? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he ever give you instructions on how to put 
up a wall, or how to put on a roof, or anything 
of that type? 
A. No. 
Q. What's the most specific instruction that you can 
recall him ever having given you? 
A. I guess near the start of the job. And that was 
to build the garage first. 
Q. Is that all he said, was "build the garage 
%
 first."? 
• • • 
• • •• 
• 
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A. "I'd like you to do the garage first and theji
 # 
work on the addition." 
Transcript, pages 42, 43, and 44. 
The type of input Jacobsen had in this contruction project did not 
rise to the level of supervision or control contemplated by the statute. 
Jacobsen exercised only the type of oversight the architect and owner exerted 
over Ring when they visited the jobsite personally. Jacobsen's efforts were 
entirely directed at assuring the entire remodeling job was performed to the 
satisfaction of the customer. Jacobsen had no hands-on supervision or control 
of the carpentry work being done. 
Considering the second prong of the test, the Administrative Law 
Judge indicated: 
In this case, there is no doubt that the sub-contract 
work being done by Mr. Ring was part or process in 
the trade or business of Mr. Jacobsen as the general 
contractor. 
Order, page 3. 
This statement is inaccurate. As a general contractor, Jacobsen's only 
responsibility was to choreograph the activities of the various 
sub-contractors in assuring that the project is completed in a timely and 
workman-like fashion. Jacobsen's business was project management, not 
carpentry. At the time of this accident, Jacobsen clearly did no carpentry 
work and retained the services of no employees who did such carpentry work. 
According to his testimony, Jacobsen had five jobs going at the time of Pugh's 
injury. (Transcript, page 49) The carpentry aspects of these jobs were bid. 
According to Jacobsen, Ring was only one of three bidders for the job in 
question. (Transcript, page 49) It was Jacobsen's practice to sub-contract 
approximately 80% of the tasks involved in custom homebuilding. (Transcript, 
page 49) Such jobs included the mechanical, electrical, carpentry, roofing, 
sheetrock, and painting* (Transcript, page 54) 
While Jacobsen had, in the past, employed carpenters or personally 
undertaken carpentry work, he had done neither for four or five months before 
Pugh's industrial accident. Jacobsen said he stopped doing business in this 
manner as he was busy on several projects and was not as skillful a carpenter 
as those who he could retain as subs. (Transcript, pages 49, 58) 
Based on a review of the entire transcript, it is apparent that 
carpentry work was not part or process in the trade or business of Jacobsen. 
The fact that Jacobsen, himself, had done carpentry work over his 20 years in 
construction and as an employer had employed carpenters directly some months 
prior to Pugh's injury is irrelevant. The fact of the matter is that as 
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of the time of Pugh's accident, Jacobsen's trade or business did not involve 
carpentry work or, for that matter, many other skilled trades pspe^s^cy itt the 
building of custom homes. 
• • • • 
• • • • • In applying the Graham and Frisby cases, the Administfa\iveaCaw tfudge 
noted that Frisby should be considered as controlling since that ruling 
followed Graham by two weeks. Defendants take exception to this logic. It 
should be noted that the Graham case was without dissent while Chief Justice 
Hall and Justice Howell dissented in the Frisby case. Further, since the time 
Frisby was decided, one of the majority Judges, Justice Oaks, has left the 
bench. Finally, the Administrative Law Judge himself has relied on Graham in 
ruling against an alleged statutory employer/employee relationship. The 
Commission's specific attention is directed to Case No. 84001011, Jim Crosman 
v. Rocky Mountain Coating and State Insurance Fund, decided by Judge Sums ion 
on March 8, 1985. A copy of the Crosman case is attached for reference as 
Exhibit A. 
POINT TWO 
In his order, the Administrative Law Judge found that Ring and 
Jacobsen and/or the State Fund were jointly and severally liable to Pugh for 
the workers compensation benefits due as result of Pugh's injury. No basis in 
the statute or in case law is cited for the Administrative Law Judge's 
conclusion that joint and several liability is appropriate. 
Defendants believe a finding of joint and several liability is 
inappropriate as joint and several liability connotes joint employment. 
According to Professor Larson: 
The normal consequence of joint employment is an 
award calling for joint and several liability, 
usually without apportionment. ... (Section 48.40, 
page 8-110) 
Joint employment occurs when a single employee, 
under contract with two employers, and under the 
simultaneous control of both, simultaneously 
performed services for both employers, and when the 
service for each employer is the same as, or is 
closely related to, that for the other. In such 
case, both employers are liable for workmen's 
compensation. ... (Section 48.4, page 8-107) 
Concerning the trend in statutory liability, Professor Larson notes that the 
usual liability of a statutory employer is "secondary." (Section 49.1, 
page 9-1) 
182 
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The Utah statute provides no direction as to whether pr. nQt.Jiability • 
as between a common-law employer and a statutory employer wouljd SJsIj&ilitJ artdS j • 
several, primary, or secondary. However, some hint is found ill Jthfi Stitiute is^ • 
the legislature saw fit to create a Default Indemnity Fund for*tTie^purposV of* 
paying and assuring the payment of benefits to employees of employers who 
become insolvent* Specifically, Utah Code Anno., Section 35-1-107, states in 
part: 
(1) There is created a Default Indemnity Fund for the 
purpose of paying and assuring, to persons entitled 
to, workers compensation benefits when an employer 
becomes insolvent, appoints or has appointed a 
receiver, or otherwise does not have sufficient 
funds, insurance, sureties, other security to cover 
workers compensation liabilities under this chapter* 
If it becomes necessary to pay benefits, the Fund 
will be liable for all obligations of the employer as 
set forth in Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35. (Emphasis 
added} 
This provision must be read in concert with Utah Code Anno., Sec. 35-1-58, 
which gives the employee a right to recover civil damages or workers 
compensation benefits in an action against an uninsured employer. In this 
case, the applicant, Pugh, chose to recover workers compensation benefits. 
Pursuant to Section 58, Pugh's employer, Ring, must be held liable for the 
benefits ordered paid under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. If Ring, for 
reasons of insolvency, is unable to pay those benefits, the provisions of 
Section 107 involving the Default Indemnity Fund should come into play. 
In the case at hand, the Administrative Law Judge made no reference 
to the liability of the Default Indemnity Fund to Pugh in the event that Ring 
was unable to make payment of the workers compensation benefits ordered. 
Arguably, the Default Indemnity Fund stands in the shoes of Ring and is liable 
before any statutory employer. 
This argument has not been ruled on by the Utah Supreme Court. 
However, failure to so interpret the interrelationship of Utah Code Anno., 
Sec* 35-1-42, 58, and 107, would force a labored and illogical application of 
the scheme of protection provided an employee. Bypassing the liability of the 
Default Indemnity Fund and placing all responsibility on the statutory 
employer effect a double burden on a responsible employer who obtains workers 
compensation insurance coverage and who thereby contributes to the funding 
structure of the Default Indemnity Fund. Why should such an employer first 
pay into the Default Indemnity Fund and then be found liable as a statutory 
employer and be forced to pay a claim? One must question under what 
circumstances the Default Indemnity Fund would ever pay a claim for benefits 
against an insolvent sub-contractor where there ,1s a general contractor. This 
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also brings into question a potential conflict of interest between the 
Industrial Commission and the Default Indemnity Fund. Organi^iogaJJy,
 #the • 
Default Indemnity Fund is housed at and is operated as an armj3t#t&e: : : • ; I 
Industrial Commission, but yet is a defendant in this very lavfcilit; I I I . IJt 
The Order of the Administrative Law Judge should be reversed as to 
the joint and several liability of Ring, Jacobsen, and the State Insurance 
Fund. The Order should be re-written to make Ring primarily liable with the 
Default Indemnity Fund standing in pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 107 
should Ring become insolvent. Then, assuming that Jacobsen is still found as 
a statutory employer, Jacobsen and the State Insurance Fund should be placed 
in a position of secondary liability only if non-payment by Ring and the 
Default Indemnity Fund occurs. 
NOW, THEREFORE, defendants in the above referenced matter petition 
the Industrial Commission to review and modify the Order as urged above. 
DATED, this 1 8**day of April, 1986. 
DENNIS V. LLOYD « 
Attorney for Defendants 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 85000966 
MARK PUGH, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
BRUCE RING 
(UNINSURED) 
DENNIS JACOBSEN and/or 
STATE INSURANCE FUND and 
DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On March 26, 1986, an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission 
issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order awarding the 
Applicant In the above captioned case temporary total compensation^ and medical 
expenses. The Applicant suffered an on-the-job fall on October 2, 1983. At 
the time of the fall, the Applicant was employed by the Defendant, Bruce Ringe 
as a laborer/carpenter. The Applicant and Ring were performing work for the 
Defendant/general contractor, Dennis Jacobsen, when the accident occurred. On 
that date, Ring was not insured for workers* compensation and Jacobsen was 
insured with the State Insurance Fund. The Administrative Law Judge found 
that Ring and Jacobsen's insurer, the State Insurance Fund, were jointly and 
severally liable for the benefits awarded the Applicant. On April 21, 1986, 
the Defendant/State Insurance Fund filed a Motion for Review contesting the 
joint and several liability, and arguing that Ring was the employer and should 
be held liable for the workers* compensation benefits. The State Insurance 
Fund states that if Ring was uninsured at the date of accident and is now 
insolvent, that the Default Indemnity Fund should pay any benefits awardedc 
The Commission is of the opinion that the Administrative Law Judge correctly 
awarded benefits as against Ring and the State Insurance Fund, and that the 
Default Indemnity Fund is not liable to pay benefits in this matter. 
In* its Motion for Review, the State Insurance Fund argues that the 
Administrative Law Judge incorrectly applied the "statutory employer" provi-
sion of U. C. A. 35-1-42, to the facts in this case* That provision reads as 
follows: 
••Where any employer procures any work to be done wholly or 
in part for him by a contractor over whose work he retains 
supervision or control., and such work is a part or process 
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in the trade or business of the employer, such contractor, 
and persons employed by him, and all subcontractors under 
him, and all persons employed by any such subcontractors, 
shall be deemed, within the meaning of this section, 
employees of such original employer." 
The Administrative Law Judge found that Jacobsen retained supervision 
or control over the work performed by Ring, and that Ring's work was a part or 
process of Jacobsen's trade or business. Therefore, per U. C. A. 35-1-42, the. 
Administrative Law Judge found that the Applicant was both an employee of Ring 
and also an employee of Jacobsen, causing Ring and Jacobsen to be jointly and 
severally liable for the Applicant's benefits. 
The State Insurance Fund argues that the facts show that Jacobsen did 
not retain supervision or control over Ring, and that Ring's carpentry work 
was not a part or process of Jacobsen's project management business. Regarding 
the supervision and control, the State Insurance Fund cites particular pages of 
the hearing transcript for testimony which indicates Ring acted independently 
and without the supervison or control of Jacobsen. The State Insurance Fund 
notes Ring provided his own tools (p. 34), hired his own labor (p. 36), and 
that Jacobsen gave no instructions to Ring with respect to the performance of 
the carpentry and did no carpentry himself (p. 35 and 57). Also noted was the 
fact that Jacobsen did not direct Ring's starting or stopping time for work 
(p. 50), and the fact that Ring was free to work other jobs (p. 35). The 
State Insurance Fund concludes these facts show no control or supervision by 
Jacobsen over Ring, and therefore, U. C. A. 35-1-42, is not applicable and 
Ring alone is responsible for the Applicant's benefits (as he alone was the 
Applicant's employer). The State Insurance Fund also argues that Ring's car-
pentry is not a part or process of Jacobsen's project management business as 
project management does not necessarily involve carpentry. 
The Commission has reviewed the hearing transcript, and finds that 
the testimony cited by the State Insurance Fund does support a finding of 
limited control on the part of Jacobsen. However, other testimony seems to 
point towards more than just limited control. There is testimony that 
Jacobsen had some voice in how many employees Ring needed, and some voice in 
whether or not those employed by Ring were performing up to standard (p. 39 
and 41). Jacobsen himself conceded, and Ring and the Applicant also testified 
to the fact that Jacobsen was at the job site where Ring and the Applicant 
worked, two to five times a week, and that Jacobsen supervised and directed 
changes while there. Jacobsen also conceded he occasionally spent the entire 
day at the job (p. 28, 29, 30, and 52). Also, even though Ring may have been 
free to work for other contractors> he, in fact, did not. These factors in-
dicate the higher degree of control associated with an employment relationship. 
Similarly, there is evidence that carpentry was, in fact, more often than not 
55 
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a part and process of Jacobsen*s business. Jacobsen himself testified he did 
not always contract out the carpentry and did some carpentry himself (p 55). 
With the respect to the "part or process" issue, the Commission is 
satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to show carpentry was a part or 
process of Jacobsen*s business. There has been no real argument or evidence 
to the contrary. With respect to the control issue, it is clear that there is 
evidence pointing to very little control as well as evidence of a higher 
degree of control. Because of this, the Commission feels it is appropriate to 
look at the case law cited by both the Administrative Law Judge and the State^ 
Insurance Fund. L. Jack Graham v. R. Thome Foundation and State Insurance 
Fund, 675 P. 2d 1196 (Utah 1984) is a case where the Supreme Court found 
insufficient control or supervision to apply U. C. A. 35-1-42, and hold the 
general contractor to be an employer. The Court looked at some of the same 
factors as have been pointed out by the State Insurance Fund in the instant 
case, such as the ownership of the tools by the subcontractor, the fact that 
the subcontractor was free to contract elsewhere, and the fact the subcontrac-
tor worked his own schedule. However, two factors noted by the Court in 
Graham demonstrate that that case involved much less control and supervison 
than does the instant case. In Graham, the subcontractor worked for several 
other contractors while he worked for Thome, and during one month, actually 
worked only three days for Thorne and worked the rest of the month for other 
contractors. In the instant case, Ring worked for Jacobsen alone, full timee 
Also, in the Graham case, the contractor knew very little about the work he 
hired Graham to perform, therefore, he was not competent to supervise Graham*s 
work except in a very general way., Once again, this is not true in the instant 
case, where Jacobsen knew carpentry, and therefore, could and did supervise 
the work performed. 
In the other case cited by the Administrative Law Judge and the State 
Insurance Fund, Pinter Construction Company v. Clifford P. Frisby. 678 P. 2d 
305 (Utah 1984), the Court found a minimal amount of control to be sufficient 
for purposes of applying the "statutory employer" provisions of U. Co A. 
35-1-42. Concern for meeting the deadline, and the resultant directions to 
the subcontractor to hurry, is the only factor of control noted by the Court. 
The Commission finds much more evidence of control in the instant case, and in 
viewing the Court's interpretation of sufficient control in Frisby, finds 
Jacobsen had sufficient control over Ring so as to invoke the "statutory 
employer" provision of U. C. A. 35-1-42. Furthermore, the Court's decision in 
Graham demonstrates that less control than is indicated in.the instant case is 
necessary before it can be found that U. C. A. 35-1-42, is not applicable* 
The Graham facts show not only no control by the Contractor, but also an in-
ability to supervise because of unfamiliarity with the work the subcontractor 
was performing. Those facts are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the 
instant case., and so the Commission must conclude the instant case is an 
appropriate case for application of the "statutory employer" provision of U. 
•C. A. 35-1-42. 
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With respect to the State Insurance Fund's argument that the Default 
Indemnity Fund should pay any benefits due the Applicant should Ring be 
insolvent, the Commission feels that the existence of the Default Indemnity 
Fund does not preclude application of U. C. A. 35-1-42. The Commission finds 
that if the legislature had wanted the Default Indemnity Fund to take the 
place of "statutory" employers, the legislature would have repealed the 
"statutory employer" section of U. C. A. 35-1-42, when the Default Indemnity 
Fund legislation was passed. As the legislature did not do so, the Commission 
finds the Default Indemnity Fund was not intended to replace statutory 
employers. In conclusion, the Commission finds that there is no Default 
Indemnity Fund liability in this matter, and that the Administrative Law Judge 
correctly applied U. C. A. 35-1-42, to the facts of this case. Therefore, the 
Defendants, Ring and the State Insurance Fund, are jointly and severally 
liable for the benefits awarded to the Applicant in the Administrative Law 
Judge's March 26, 1986 Order. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendant/State Insurance Fund's 
April 21, 1986 Motion for Review is denied, and the Administrative Law Judge's 
March 26f 1986 Order is hereby affirmed. 
^LAAI 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
/J*** day of June, 1986. 
''Linda J. Strasbdrg 
Commission/Secretary 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Chairman 
- / ^ 
Lenic^L. Nielsen 
Commissioner 
